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Submission on the Sentencing and Parole Reform Bill

To the Law & Order Select Committee

Executive Summary

The Sentencing and Parole Reform Bill submitted to Parliament is an important measure that seeks to promote the safety and well-being of the citizenry through reasonable sentencing and parole measures that target habitual and predatory offenders. Based on my extensive research and study of criminal sentencing laws in the United States, including policies known as “Three Strikes and You’re Out,” I urge Parliament to adopt this bill for the following reasons:

• Research has consistently demonstrated that habitual offenders commit a majority of all offenses; in many cases, “career criminals” commit more than 20 offenses per year – and their involvement in criminal activity typically spans two decades or more. Moreover, habitual offenders tend to engage in all types of criminal activity, including drug, property, and violent crimes, and offending patterns tend to become more violent over time. Nevertheless, repeat offenders, who often resist traditional means of social conformity, can be positively impacted by criminal justice sanctions. Although not all recidivists will desist after punishment, the rate of reoffending is much lower after sanctions have been applied. Thus, laws that target repeat offenders can lead to dramatic crime reductions by curtailing the careers of those responsible for large number of crimes.
• Mandating increased penalties will help to eliminate sentencing disparities and promote consistent punishments for repeat offenders if the sentences are routinely applied. Because consistency must not outweigh the need for fairness, allowing for limited judicial discretion can be an important safeguard that ensures that justice is preserved. However, if judges routinely ignore the law or manipulate sentences in order to avoid imposing the mandatory penalties, then the crime-control benefits of the measure will be eradicated and the public’s confidence in the fairness of the justice system will be compromised.
• Strengthening sentences and requiring stricter standards for parole eligibility can help to promote public safety. Increased penalties for continued criminal behavior helps to reaffirm the government’s commitment to protecting members of the public, seeks to deter criminal activity by increasing the costs associated with criminal behavior, and, if necessary, works to incapacitate offenders who prove to be incorrigible. Past and present studies have shown that offending behavior is curtailed through increased sanctions, and the sudden drop in crime experienced in the U.S. following the widespread adoption of tougher sentencing measures is evidence of their effectiveness.
• Promoting tougher criminal sentences is an effective way to protect the poor and those in minority communities from predatory criminals. Government statistics provided by the U.S. Department of Justice has shown that the most vulnerable members of society – women, children, the poor, and those from a racial or ethnic minority background – are victimized at much higher rates than those who are white, middle-aged or older, or from middle-or upper-class communities. Evidence from the past two decades suggests that stricter sentencing measures can help to reduce the number of vulnerable victims by targeting those who prey on the poor and the weak. Moreover, reduced homicide rates can lead to longer life expectancy rates among members of minority communities.
• Recent experience in the United States has also shown that enhanced sentencing measures work best when combined with other types of programs that can help reintegrate offenders back into the community. Although recidivism rates for offenders have been historically high – in most jurisdictions the rate is between 40 percent and 60 percent – government re-entry assistance in the form of temporary housing, vocational training, and counseling promises to help to reduce the incidents of re-offending and encourage offenders to seek productive and useful lives. Some offenders, such as those addicted to illegal narcotics, need specialized services in order to remain crime-free. Others, including certain types of sex offenders, present ongoing risks to public safety and require law enforcement supervision even after the parole period has ended.

Recommendation for Modifications to Sections 86B – 86H

I would recommend that this committee consider modifying the criteria for the enhanced sentence so that it is tied to the offender’s previous offense – not the previous sentence. Nearly all criminal justice experts agree that when sentencing is unguided or unstructured, disparity will abound. When enhancements are added later on, this disparity becomes exponentially compounded.

As this bill is presently structured, if two similar defendants commit the same type of crime, such as aggravated robbery, and one offender is sentenced to four years in prison and the other is sentenced to five, only the second offender will have earned a “strike” on his record. If the pattern is repeated again, then only the second offender would have earned enough strikes to be eligible for the 25-years-to-life sentence enhancement upon conviction of a third qualifying offense, despite the fact that their offenses were virtually the same. Ultimately, this raises questions of equity, since most presume that in a fair system of justice similar defendants receive similar sanctions for their conduct. If they do not – if, in fact, defendants receive dissimilar penalties for similar conduct – then the justice system will be viewed as arbitrary and public confidence will be eroded. Additionally, if the law is to deter would-be criminals, then people must be able to predict with some accuracy what the costs will be for their transgressions. If the sanctions are unpredictable because some judges sentence leniently and others sentence more harshly, then the deterrent benefit will likely be lost.

In conclusion, the government’s responsibility to protect the innocent and preserve order within society is best achieved when justice is swift, when sanctions are certain, and when penalties for persistent, unremitting criminal behavior are increasingly severe. Policies that do this can be a reasonable first response in the fight against crime.

Evidence in Support of the Sentencing and Parole Bill

Brief Overview of United States Penal Reform

In the early twentieth century, advances in psychology, sociology, and the medical sciences prompted criminologists to declare that with the right course of treatment, crime could be cured. Accordingly, American lawmakers, who were eager to halt rising crime rates, revised sentencing rules so that inmates could be sentenced according to their rehabilitation potential instead of the severity of their crimes. They also created a system of probation and revised parole criteria in order to facilitate expanded individualized treatment plans (McKelvey 1977; Rothman 1980).

By the early 1970s, however, ongoing evaluative research revealed that this new rehabilitation-oriented sentencing system was fraught with problems. First, a number of high-profile analyses revealed that rehabilitation programs were largely ineffective in reducing the recidivism rates of their participants; a few isolated programs appeared promising, but, as a whole, “nothing worked” to curb crime (Martinson 1974; Wilson 1985). Second, several influential studies also revealed that some judges, in using their expanded discretion to sentence according to the individual characteristics of the offender, discriminated against poor, uneducated, and/or minority defendants by sending them to prison more often than other defendants (Frankel 1972). Third, government reports indicated that nearly half the nation’s offenders, who committed, on average, up to twelve offenses per person before imprisonment, continued to reoffend after being released from prison. This persistent lawlessness caused many to question the effectiveness of the entire system, and prompted some policymakers to declare that during the rehabilitation era the prison gate had been transformed into a revolving door.

As a result of these findings, nearly all of the states reformed their penal systems to reflect more traditional penal philosophies of deservedness, deterrence, and incapacitation. In most states, indeterminate sentencing laws were replaced by determinate provisions that linked criminal sentences to offense severity. Furthermore, parole conditions were made more stringent in order to promote public safety, and drug offenders and gun users were subjected to mandatory sentences. Additionally, “Three Strikes” laws imposed sentencing enhancements upon repeat offenders for their failure to abandon their criminal ways, violent juvenile offenders were transferred to adult court for prosecution and sanctioning, and credits for good behavior were reduced in order to promote sentencing transparency. Policing reforms also cracked down on lawless and unruly behavior, and restrictions on plea bargaining increased prosecution and conviction rates for detained offenders.

Since implementing these reforms, a number of indications confirm that the reforms are working as intended. Prison populations in the United States initially expanded after the more stringent sentencing laws were implemented, but the growth rates quickly stabilized as deterrence and incapacitation worked to keep new offenses to a minimum. The overall crime rate, both nationally and in most states, also plummeted to near-historic lows. In some urban areas, for example, the number of property crimes and violent victimizations was reduced by more than half their previous levels. In addition, public opinion polls reveal that crime no longer tops the list of pressing national concerns, and fewer people report being afraid of crime than at anytime in the last twenty years.

Despite this positive evidence, a number of academics remain committed to the orthodox perspective that penal policies like these do not work. However, a growing body of research contradicts this postulation, and, as a result, a number of academics now conclude that policies that promote more traditional penal philosophies can be effective and useful in a comprehensive fight against crime.

The Problem of Repeat Offenders

Much of the impetus for addressing the problem of repeat offenders came from a landmark study by noted criminologist Marvin Wolfgang. Wolfgang followed a cohort of nearly 10,000 Philadelphia youth, from birth to age 18, and studied their educational and court records for evidence of wrong-doing. Quite by accident, Wolfgang and his research associates made a startling discovery: approximately 6% of the boys had become chronic offenders and had committed more than five offenses apiece. Combined, Wolfgang also found that they were responsible for more than half of all of the crimes committed by the entire cohort. Furthermore, they found that as the youth progressed in their criminal careers, the severity of their offending behavior increased as well (Wolfgang, Figlio, and Sellin 1972).

Wolfgang’s findings have been replicated in a number of different studies, including a recent analysis of 6,400 youth in Orange County, California, which found that 8% of juvenile offenders commit more than half of all serious or violent crimes attributed to juvenile offenders (Schumacher and Kurtz 1999), and a study of youth housed in the California Youth Authority (a juvenile detention facility), which revealed that the average offender had been arrested for 10 or more crimes in the years leading up to their first detention (Haapanen, Britton, and Croisdale 2007). Although researchers have noted that the majority of first-time juvenile offenders will not likely reoffend, a small percentage of juvenile offenders persist in their criminality and are likely to be arrested a second or third time. Moreover, they determined that with each subsequent arrest, the offender was even more likely to offend again.

Research has also found a correlation between habitual offending and the length of one’s criminal career. In general, criminal statistics show a strong correlation between certain demographic age groups and rates of offending. Young people – usually between the ages of 15 and 24 – commit the most crimes; senior citizens (those 65 and above) commit the fewest. Criminologists are divided on the reasons why most people desist from committing crimes as they reach adulthood, but the consensus seems to be that pressures to conform to societal expectations in the areas of employment, family obligations, marital relationships, etc., are sufficient to encourage social, law-abiding behavior. The majority of offenders who engage in reckless behavior as adolescents or young adults go on to lead productive lives; their “careers” are usually brief and relatively harmless. However, for those who begin their criminal careers before the age of 15, the span of that career stretches well into adulthood. Although researchers have confirmed that the rate of criminal activity for most chronic offenders will slowly decline over time, recent studies have reported that unless they are incarcerated, habitual offenders will continue to commit crimes for an average of 17-19 years. Moreover, violent offenders, or those who demonstrate a propensity toward violence, have longer career spans than offenders who specialize in drug or property offenses (Ezell 2007).

The problem presented by chronic offenders is not found just among juveniles, however; habitual adult offenders also commit a large percentage of crimes. A 1989 study by the federal Bureau of Justice Statistics found, for example, that a small percentage of the nation’s inmates were collectively responsible for more than 1.3 million offenses. The average offender included in the study had committed 12 arrest offenses before being incarcerated. After being released from prison, this same group of offenders committed an additional 326,746 arrest offenses within three years’ time, for an average of three additional charges per offenders (Beck and Shipley 1989). As Table 1 reveals below, nearly two-thirds of the offenders had been re-arrested for a new offense – not merely a parole violation – within the three year observation period. Nearly half were convicted of the new offense and more than two-fifths were sentenced to a new prison term.

Table 1: Rate of Recidivism by Repeat Offenders

Percent of State Prisoners Released in 1983 who were:
Time After Release	Arrested for new crime	Convicted of new crime	Sentenced for new crime
6 months	25.0%	11.3%	8.4%
1 year	39.3	23.1	18.6
2 year s	54.5	38.3	32.8
3 years	62.5	46.8	41.4

Source: Bureau of Justice Statistics, Recidivism of Prisoners Released in 1983, Table 2, p. 3.

A follow-up study found that by 1994, rates of re-offending had become even worse. Out of the 300,000 prisoners who were released in 15 states in 1994, more than two-thirds (67.5%) were rearrested for a new criminal offense – often for a serious or violent offense – within three years of release. This represents a 5% increase over the 1983 levels. Even more startling was the discovery that over half of the offenders (51.8%) were returned to prison because of a parole violation or sentencing for a new offense within the first three years (Langan and Levin 2002).

In light of these findings, policymakers in many states called for the adoption of sentencing policies that specifically targeted these habitual and high-rate offenders. The problem that they soon encountered, however, is that it is nearly impossible to determine in advance who is likely to be a chronic offender. Although many researchers tried to create mathematical models that would allow courts to do this, the error rates were unacceptably high. Even with sophisticated tools of analysis, two significant problems remain. First, there exists a strong possibility that some offenders would be falsely labeled as a chronic offender and needlessly incarcerated for long periods of time. Second, some high-rate offenders would be erroneously released, thus putting public safety in jeopardy. In either of these scenarios, the ethical consequences would be devastating, which explains why these models were never adopted (Cohen 1978; Greenwood and Abrahamse 1982; Gottfredson and Gottfredson 1986; Tonry 1987).

More Practical Sentencing Measures: Enhanced Penalties and Mandatory Minimums

Although predicting dangerousness in advance has proven to be impossible, incorporating past behavior into the sentencing equation is both practical and reasonable. Using the general premise that “past behavior predicts future behavior,” states, beginning in the mid-1970s and continuing through the early 2000s, modified their criminal sentencing laws in order to incorporate prior history into the sanctioning process. Some states, such as Minnesota, adopted sentencing guidelines wherein the type of sentence, or the length of the sentence, is based upon both the prior history of the offender and the severity of the present offense. Offenders, for example, who have lengthy or violent past offenses face a greater penalty than those who have few prior crimes or no history of violence (Miethe and Moore 1989; Frase 1995). In other states, the decision to grant probation or require incarceration is also based on the offender’s past criminal conduct. First-time offenders might receive probation, but repeat offenders almost always receive some form of detention. In determinate sentencing systems, the presence of a prior conviction can be considered an aggravating factor, which can increase the sentence for the most current offense (Messinger and Johnson 1978; Casper, Brereton, and Neal 1982; Gatz 1982). Many states also now require their parole boards to take prior criminal actions, especially previous instances of violent behavior, into account when deciding to grant parole.

Mandatory minimum sentences have also been used by lawmakers to address persistent criminal behavior. Begun in the 1970s, mandatory minimums were initially used to combat specific types of crime. For example, when heroin use was perceived to be a great social problem in the early 1970s, New York Governor Nelson Rockefeller urged the state legislature to adopt a law requiring a minimum of 15 years to life for offenders caught in possession of heroin (Carlson 1982). Lawmakers in Massachusetts and Michigan also experimented with imposing a mandatory minimum add-on sentence to offenders who committed a crime with a handgun (Carlson 1982; Heumann, Loftin, and McDowall 1982). Although there were a number of problems with the way these early laws were structured and implemented – many prosecutors and judges were given the flexibility to ignore them – they nonetheless paved the way for more effective mandatory minimums to be used later on.

Moreover, mandatory minimums were also thought to be an easy way to promote sentencing consistency. During the late 1960s and 1970s, policymakers and criminal justice experts expressed much concern over the apparent arbitrariness inherent in the indeterminate sentencing process. Court observers noticed that because judges were allowed to craft individualized sentences, some offenders received unusually long sentences while others escaped with no punishment at all. One study, for example, found that only 27% of armed robbers convicted in Los Angeles County in 1970 were sentenced to prison. The remaining 73% received no prison sentence at all, despite the fact that many of them were repeat offenders (Twentieth Century Fund Task Force on Criminal Sentencing 1976). Other studies found that under flexible sentencing laws, white and black defendants convicted of similar crimes might very well receive dissimilar sentences. Judges sometimes treated white offenders more favorably because they had access to a stable social network, or had more financial resources at their disposal. Poor minority defendants were more likely to be sent to prison, or to be sent for longer periods of time, because their rehabilitation prospects were viewed by the judges as being less promising (Frankel 1972).

Revelations like these prompted many observers to conclude that the system was patently unfair, and, in many cases, far too lenient on serious criminals. Combined with evidence that rehabilitation alone failed to curb offending behavior (Martinson 1974), policymakers in nearly every state worked diligently to overhaul the penal system. The most common reform limited judicial discretion over the sentencing decision by linking the criminal sanction to the criminal offense. Instead of having judges subjectively determine who would be imprisoned for their transgressions or deciding how long they would serve, legislative bodies affixed penalties to the offenses themselves, thus determining in advance what the sanction would be. This reform was thought to not only improve fairness and eliminate the arbitrariness that had plagued the system in the past, but it was also believed to help promote deterrence by allowing the offender to more accurately estimate the costs associated with criminal wrongdoing.

Although this first wave of reform was successful in eliminating much of the sentencing disparity and promote more uniform treatment among offenders, many believed that the system was still too lenient on criminals. This opinion became even more widespread when crime across the country suddenly spiked in the early 1990s. As Table 2 reveals, between 1960 and 1990, the violent crime rate increased by nearly five-fold, and the property crime rate nearly tripled. Galvanized by public outrage, lawmakers at the state and federal level quickly adopted a host of policy measures that promised to “get tough” on crime. Most states increased resources for law enforcement, promoted “truth-in-sentencing” measures by curtailing parole or reducing good time credits, adopted policies that required certain juvenile offenders to be tried as adults, and imposed mandatory sentences on repeat and violent offenders (Walsh 2007).

Table 2: Crime Rates – California and the United States
(Number per 100,000 Population)

Year	Violent Crime (California)	Violent Crime (U.S.)	Property Crime (California)	Property Crime (U.S.)
1960	239	161	3235	1726
1965	282	200	4037	2249
1970	475	364	5864	3621
1975	655	488	6549	4811
1980	894	597	6940	5353
1985	765	557	5753	4651
1986	921	618	5842	4863
1987	918	610	5588	4940
1988	930	637	5706	5027
1989	978	663	5786	5078
1990	1045	732	5558	5089
1991	1090	758	5683	5140
1992	1120	758	5560	4903
1993	1078	747	5379	4738
1994	1013	714	5161	4660

Source: FBI’s Uniform Crime Reports

Perhaps the most well-known among the reforms initiated during this time were the mandatory minimum sentencing laws that targeted repeat offenders. Between 1993 and 1996, half the states and the federal government adopted sentencing measures identified by the idiomatic phrase, “Three Strikes and You’re Out.” As Appendix 1 records, the laws themselves varied from jurisdiction to jurisdiction, but most involved two basic components. First, the laws sharply curtailed the ability of prosecutors and/or judges to alter, ignore, or nullify the charges or sentences for eligible sentences. Second, the laws stipulated lengthy mandatory sentences for offenders convicted of a second and/or third qualifying offense. Often, the laws were accompanied by additional changes to the sentencing scheme that reduced or eliminated the eligibility for parole for certain types of offenders, reduced or eliminated “good-time” credits in attempt to promote “truth-in-sentencing,” or stipulated additional penalties for criminals convicted of specific crimes. Although the content and implementation patterns ultimately varied from state to state, the underlying sentiment was the same: People were tired of battling crime and no longer had the patience to be lenient with repeat offenders.

Of all the Three Strike laws that were adopted during this time period, the version enacted in California has received the most political, media, and scholarly attention. Part of the interest can be attributed to the circumstances surrounding its initial adoption. The 1993 kidnapping and murder of 12-year-old Polly Klaas by a repeat offender became a national news story, and some of the nation’s most prominent politicians, including California Governor Pete Wilson, California Senator Dianne Feinstein, and President Bill Clinton, used this case to press for tougher sentencing measures. The interest can also be attributed to the scope of the law, as California’s Three Strikes policy is the broadest of the more than two dozen measures that were adopted during this time. The sentencing provision features both a second strike component, which requires an automatic doubling of the presumptive sentence, and a third strike feature, which requires an automatic 25-years-to-life sentence upon conviction of a third serious or violent offense. All of the prior “strikes” must be serious or violent offenses as defined by the state’s penal code, but the triggering strike offense can be any serious crime; it need not involve actual violence. Thus, while many states have harsher third strike sentences – a number of them, in fact, require a life sentence without parole – California’s law captures more offenders because of this generous “last strike” provision. As a result, many argue that California’s law is more effective because it prevents a larger percentage of dangerous criminals from striking again.

Evidence of Effectiveness: Overall Crime Reduction

After state and federal lawmakers enacted these various reforms, they were interested in two follow-up questions: Did the stricter sentences work to reduce crime? If yes, then why? Although it seems as though crime reduction would be an easy variable to measure, it is often exceedingly problematic. By nature, crimes are committed in secret so that the perpetrators can avoid detection. As a result, government calculations about how much crime has been committed are naturally prone to error. Not all crimes are made known to the police, for example, and many crimes, such as narcotic use, involve willing participants. Moreover, some victims refuse to alert the police out of fear of future retaliation, thus many crimes are never reported. Even when police are informed of criminal activity, not all police departments make accurate recordkeeping a priority. Most departments now keep detailed accounts of crimes that occur in their jurisdiction, but some do not. In addition, law enforcement agencies are locally controlled; therefore, national crime statistics are passed along to the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) on a voluntary basis. Today, the federal government supplements police data with information from a crime victimization survey that is administered randomly and anonymously. Although it has helped authorities count previously undocumented or underreported crimes, it, too, is an imperfect instrument. It only solicits responses from victims age 12 or older, thereby excluding input from younger victims; it still has a difficult time capturing consensual crime information; and it asks participants to recall events that occurred over a six-month period; and it is administered to households, so individuals who are homeless, or who move frequently (and who are often victimized at higher rates), are not included in the survey.

However flawed the instruments might be, the combined measurements can help lawmakers determine if crime is increasing, if crime is decreasing, or if crime is remaining static. In this case, the evidence is clear: after the new reforms were implemented, crime in the United States fell suddenly and steeply. Using data from the FBI, Figure 1 reveals that violent crime rates plummeted after the early 1990s. For the U.S. as a whole, violent crime rates have declined more than 38% after peaking in 1991. In Florida, violent crime decreased more than 41% after reaching its record high in 1990. For California and New York, the same holds true. Violent crime in California has dropped 53% since 1992; in New York, violent crime has decreased by a stunning 65% since cresting in 1990.

Figure 1: Reported Violent Crime in U.S., California, Florida, New York, Texas
(Number per 100,000 Population)

Source: Bureau of Justice Statistics, Data Online: http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs

As depicted in Figure 1, the decrease in the violent crime rate in California and New York are generally similar in their trend lines, yet the percentage of decrease in New York is 12% greater. Some have pointed to this discrepancy as proof that some of the more stringent sentencing laws in California are not responsible for the rapid decrease in time. Although the reasons for crime reduction are discussed in the section below, it is important to note that California has a large undocumented alien population that can make it difficult to detect and apprehend certain groups of offenders. Presently, California houses more than half of the nation’s undocumented alien population, which is estimated to be between three and four million people (Hoefer, Rytina, and Baker 2008).

Of course, while most illegal immigrants are hard-working and law-abiding, the large number of serious offenderss who take advantage of the porous border with Mexico to ferry drugs, weapons, and criminals into and out of the state, can work to undermine the state’s crime- control efforts. One study found that 95% of all outstanding arrest warrants for homicide issued in Los Angeles County in 2004 were for illegal aliens. Moreover, two-thirds of all arrest warrants for serious or violent crimes – nearly 17,000 – issued during this same year were for undocumented immigrants. Additionally, much of California’s violent gang crime is perpetrated by illegal immigrant members. In Los Angeles County, experts estimate that 60% of the 20,000 gang members belonging to the notorious Southern California 18th Street Gang are illegal aliens (MacDonald 2005). Furthermore, Los Angeles County District Attorney Steve Cooley estimates that 40% of the jail population is comprised of illegal aliens, and California corrections officials calculate that 30,000 (about 20%) of the state’s prison inmates are undocumented immigrants. Thus, while California’s sentencing laws may be among the toughest in the nation, they can only work to combat crime if the offenders are actually apprehended. The state’s inability to secure its border with Mexico has made it possible for many offenders to commit a crime, flee the country to escape apprehension, and then return a short time later. California is not alone in this problem as many other border states, such as Arizona and Texas, have experienced similar troubles. But New York, whose border with Canada is relatively secure, has been insulated from these particular challenges.

In Figure 2, the FBI crime numbers show an equally impressive drop in property crime rates nationwide and in the four largest states. The national property crime rate fell by 36% between 1991 and 2007, but many of the populous states posted even larger declines. In California, the rate fell by nearly 47% in that same time period, and between 1990 – 2007, the rates dropped by 46% in Florida, 42% in Texas, and nearly 62% in New York. Results from the Bureau of Justice Statistics’ National Crime Victimization Survey echo many of these findings. In 2001, residents reported 50% fewer violent victimizations than they did in 1994. Offense-specific questions revealed that there was a 56% decline in the number of rapes; 53% fewer robberies and 56% fewer aggravated assaults. Overall property-related victimizations in 2001 were also 47% fewer than in 1994, with the largest drops recorded for household burglary (51% less) and car theft (52% less) (see http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs).

Figure 2: Reported Property Crime in U.S., California, Florida, New York, Texas
(Number per 100,000 Population)

Source: Bureau of Justice Statistics, Data Online: http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs

Evidence of Effectiveness: Reasons for Crime Reduction

Although numerous studies have confirmed that the U.S. experienced an unprecedented decrease in crime after “get tough” reforms swept through the country, debate continues over reasons for the decline. Part of the problem is that when crime spiked in the early 1990s, policymakers initiated a number of simultaneous reforms. Just like a physician might order a number of different treatments for a patient who suddenly and mysteriously becomes critically-ill, lawmakers responded to the crime crisis by implementing a variety of policy solutions. Some states, like New York, poured money into law enforcement, increased the number of prosecutions and convictions, and lengthened sentences by tightening up parole criteria and reducing “good-time” credits. Other states, such as California, introduced new sentencing enhancements for repeat offenders, reduced “good-time” credits for prisoners, and eliminated plea bargaining for certain types of crimes. In Oregon, voters ratified “Measure 11,” which created lengthy mandatory sentences that applied to all types of offenders and tightened parole eligibility. Although the reforms had their own peculiarities, they were structured around the same general “get tough” premise, which could be summed up with the slogan, “do the crime, pay with time.” Consequently, the important question for policymakers has not been whether some reforms worked better than others; they all basically sought to do the same thing – deter and incapacitate offenders. Rather, the question becomes one of overall effectiveness: can the decrease in crime be linked to the “get tough” policy movement?

Over the past several years, dozens of studies have attempted to explain why crime fell as fast as it did. One of the most definitive explanations, however, was released in 2004 by economist Steven Levitt from the University of Chicago (Levitt 2004). In his analysis of the crime trends, Levitt confirmed the most recent conclusion of researchers, which is that offending is not related to the state of the economy. The relationship between criminal behavior and economic growth was initially theoretical; it was believed that if unemployment was high, then people would resort to stealing, burglarizing, or robbing others in order to obtain necessary financial resources. While this theory sounded plausible, data from the Great Depression, which produced unemployment rates near 28%, failed to confirm this connection. Moreover, crime rose steadily during periods of economic growth in the late 1960s. Although the theory would predict that crime would fall during this latest period of economic growth, Levitt concludes from his analysis that, at best, falling unemployment could account for a 2% reduction in property crimes, but had absolutely no impact on the reduction in violent crime.

Levitt also concludes that the recent crime decreases cannot be accounted for by demographic changes. Conventional wisdom posits that crime decreases when there are fewer adolescents and young people in society. Although the United States has experienced an overall decrease in the 15-24 age group, the number of adolescents and young adults was projected to sharply increase between 1995 – 2010. Initially, this triggered a number of warnings by criminologists that a youth-led crime wave was just on the horizon; however, this prediction of violence never materialized. The number of young people did increase, but crime – especially violent crime – remains at near-historic lows.

Similarly, Levitt debunks the assumption that gun control laws are responsible for decreases in violent crime rates. During the 1990s, the federal government and several state governments enacted a number of rigorous gun control laws in an attempt to crack down on gun-related violence. However, studies have shown – and Levitt’s findings confirm – that these laws and the popular gun “buy-back” programs have little to do with decreasing crime rates. Nonetheless, Levitt’s analysis does not include specific information on the Florida 1020- Life law, which imposes lengthy sentences on criminals who use firearms during the commission of a crime. Lawmakers boast that the law has led to a 30% decrease in the number of firearm-related offenses since it was enacted in 1998, but a more comprehensive examination of the law’s impact has yet to be published (Corrections 2007).

Concealed weapon permits and capital punishment sentences were also dismissed as explanations for the crime decreases. Having more armed law-abiding citizens can deter criminals from acting, but Levitt concludes that the recent declines in crime are not likely to be correlated with more permissive policies on this matter. It is also unlikely that use of the death penalty sanction can explain much of the decrease in crime, since only would-be murderers are likely to be deterred by criminal executions. Previous research had previously determined that for every execution, seven murders were deterred; Levitt concludes that if this statistic holds true, it could account for some of the decrease in the nation’s homicide rate. It would not, however, have any bearing on other violent crimes, and would have virtually no connection to property crimes.

Instead, Levitt concludes that the dramatic decrease in the nation’s crime rate can, in fact, be linked to criminal justice policies implemented during the 1990s. Specifically, he found that changes in law enforcement strategies and policies that increased the rate of incarceration could explain a large percentage of the overall decrease in crime. Many urban cities like New York chose to fight crime at the front of the system by adding police officers, increasing patrols, and increasing the number of arrests. Moreover, Levitt confirms through the review of multiple analyses that these efforts have been successful. Having more police officers on patrol means that offenders have a greater chance of being arrested and convicted; there is also likely a deterrent effect that is produced by the increased likelihood of detection and detention. As a result, Levitt concludes that 10 – 20% of the decrease in crime experienced between 1991 – 2001 can be attributed to by greater law enforcement.

Other states, such as California, chose to emphasize back-of-the-system reforms that increased sentences for offenders after conviction. According to Levitt, this, too, helps to explain the decrease in crime. Previously, he concluded that for every one offender that is incarcerated, fifteen crimes are prevented each year (Levitt 1996), and his findings from the past decade reiterate this conclusion. In this most recent analysis, Levitt notes that the “evidence linking increased punishments to lower crime rates is very strong” (Levitt 2004, 28), and policies that emphasized imprisonment over rehabilitation, such as those that cracked down on drug offenders, tightened up the requirements for parole, and increased the lengths of criminal sentences, produced substantial crime savings. Specifically, Levitt estimates that imprisonment-oriented policies accounted for a 12% reduction in homicide, another 12% reduction in violent crime, and an 8% reduction in property crime. Thus, about one-third of the decrease in crime can be linked imprisonment policies (Levitt 2004).

Evidence of Effectiveness: Deterrence and Incapacitation

In December 1993, a Gallup poll revealed Americans’ widespread frustration with their criminal justice system: Most respondents listed crime as one of the nation’s most pressing social problems, more than half believed that the police could not protect them from violent offenders, and more than one-third expressed disbelief that the government could do anything do combat crime. When asked what they thought ought to be done to lower crime rates, almost all of the respondents answered in a way that revealed their belief in the theory of deterrence: Nearly three-fifths agreed that murderers should be sentenced to death for their crimes; almost 75% declared that serious juvenile offenders should be tried as adults; and 86% stated that the criminal justice system was too lenient on offenders. In other words, the public believed that the “benefits” of crime were too high, and the “cost” of crime was too low (McAneny 1993).

Underlying the theory of deterrence is the basic assumption that all people are rational actors who seek to make decisions that benefit them. In the context of crime, deterrence theory proposes that people are willing to break the law because the benefits of doing so outweigh the potential costs. But, in order for people to accurately count the cost of breaking the law, sanctions must be certain, swiftly applied, and severe enough to overcome the rewards of wrongdoing. If they are not, the person might decide that the benefits of wrongdoing, which are often certain and immediate, are greater than the costs. For example, a person might decide to sell drugs because he could potentially earn much more money in this enterprise than he could through legitimate employment. But, the attractiveness of this crime – in this case, the trafficking of illegal narcotics – is diminished when the costs associated with the crime are increased. The costs could be socially imposed in the form of public scorn, but many people who are indifferent to social pressure might be persuaded to abandon their criminal plans if increased police patrols increased the certainty of apprehension, streamlined prosecution policies encouraged swift adjudication, and changes to sentencing laws increased the severity of punishment.

Accordingly, most justice systems are based upon the premise that people who might otherwise be willing to break the law will, in the end, be deterred by criminal sanctions. Thus, the challenge that confronts lawmakers is not whether a sanction for wrongdoing ought to be imposed; rather, it is the determination of how much punishment to apply. Sanctions need not be severe – just severe enough to outweigh the potential benefits of the crime. Ideally, scientific examination could help lawmakers determine the optimum level of punishment, but researchers have had a difficult time assessing deterrence – at least on the aggregate level. Often, the best that researchers can do is try to infer that deterrence is or is not present based upon the side effects that are seen. If crime increases, it can be hypothesized that deterrence has failed; however, if crime decreases, it can be surmised that deterrence has succeeded. But, because deterrence involves individual cost/benefit calculations, a null finding is not necessarily proof that deterrence is not at work. Rather, it may be that isolating elements of deterrence is more difficult within that particular setting.

Despite these inherent problems, researchers have looked for – and found – evidence that deterrence works. Early deterrence studies established that when cities added more police officers to their patrol schedules, the certainty of apprehension was increased, and crime in that jurisdiction went down. In some cases, the crime was reduced permanently; in others, it was displaced to nearby areas not affected by the patrols. Still, the fact that offenders altered their patterns of conduct in response to police patrols confirms that the increased probability of apprehension deterred some offenders from committing crimes altogether. Other studies involving specific types of crimes, such as drunk driving, spousal assault, and murder, have confirmed that increases in the certainty of arrest, and/or increases in the penalties associated with these crimes, can effectively the lower the crime rate for these offenses. Moreover, researchers have found that imprisonment can have a deterrent effect on subsequent offending; prisoners released from jail commit fewer crimes afterward than they did before being imprisoned (see generally (Wilson 1985; Blumstein et al. 1983; Nagin 1998).

Many of the reforms enacted in the United States during the mid-1990s, such as Three Strikes laws, “truth-in-sentencing” laws, and other mandatory sentencing requirements, were supposed to deter offenders by dramatically increase the costs of wrongdoing in order to help persuade habitual offenders to abandon their criminal careers and find new lines of work. Since their enactment, a number of studies have confirmed that “deterrence works.” One such study was released by the California Department of Corrections shortly after the Three Strikes law was implemented in 1994. State officials reported that there was a large increase in the number of parolees asking to leave the state. Previously, more parolees had asked to come to California to finish their period of parole supervision than had asked to leave the state. After the Three Strikes went into effect, however, this trend reversed itself; more California parolees requested leaving the state, even though state law required parolees to satisfy all legal obligations, including the payment of outstanding restitutions and fines, before their requests could be granted. Attorney General Dan Lungren concluded that parolees were afraid of Three Strikes, and wanted to leave the state lest they be ensnared by the law (Lungren 1998).

Another study by forensic psychiatrists found that offenders facing a Three Strikes sentence often faked symptoms of mental illness in an attempt to escape its provisions (Jaffe and Sharma 1998). Additionally, a survey administered to serious juvenile offenders convicted of one strike offense, 61% of the respondents stated that they would change their behavior in order to avoid a two-strike sentence. More than two-thirds (70%) indicated that they would not commit another serious or violent crime if it would result in a 25-year-to-life sentence (Schafer 1999).

More sophisticated statistical analyses also confirmed that these sentencing reforms deterred would-be offenders. In a study of California crime data, economist Joanna Shepherd found that the state’s Three Strikes law deterred new criminals from committing serious or violent felonies that could count as eligible strikes. Although fear of the first strike did not always convince them to avoid crime altogether, she found that when crimes were committed, first- time offenders opted for non-serious and non-violent offenses. According to her calculations, the deterrent effect of Three Strikes within the first two years prevented eight murders, almost 4,000 aggravated assaults, more than 10,500 robberies, and nearly 400,000 burglaries, for a direct cost savings of $900 million (Shepherd 2002). Moreover, another study found that though crime was declining nationwide, the rate of decline for certain opportunistic crimes, such as robbery, burglary, and larceny, was faster in Three Strikes states than non- Three Strike states. California’s Three Strikes law has also been found to produce a significant deterrent effect among those at risk for the third strike (Chen 2008).

In a comparative study of California offenders released from prison in 1994, those facing a third strike had a re-arrest rate that was 17 – 20% lower than those who faced only a second strike. This same effect was found in Texas among offenders who were in jeopardy of receiving a lengthy sentence under its “three-time loser” law. In contrast, arrest rates for comparable offenders in Illinois and New York – non-Three Strike states – remained the same, suggesting that at least in California and Texas, a sizeable portion of would-be strike offenders were desisting from crime in order to avoid the sentencing enhancement (Helland and Tabarrok 2007). Finally, a time-series examination of California’s Three Strikes law found that the deterrence benefits of the law increased over time, and both serious and non- serious offenses appeared to be deterred by the policy. Specifically, researchers credited the law with reducing instrumental crimes, including robbery, burglary, and larceny by 45%, and violent crimes, such as homicide, rape and assault, by 36%. Surprisingly, the authors found that the law deterred even minor offenses by 25%. Only drug-possession offenses, driven in large part by substance abuse addiction, appeared to be unaffected by the new sentencing law. In their conclusion, they suggest that would-be offenders are desisting in all types of crimes – even minor ones – out of fear of earning eligible strikes (Ramirez and Crano 2003).

Although most of the recent sentencing studies have examined the sentencing reforms that targeted repeat offenders, analyses of some of the other “get tough” provisions enacted in the 1990s are equally encouraging. Statistical models using truth-in-sentencing laws found that policies that extended prison sentences for all offenders could reduce the number of homicides by 16%, the number of aggravated assaults by 12%, the number of robberies by 24%, and the incidence of rape by 12%. Only burglary appeared to be undeterred by these laws; in fact, the model predicted burglaries to rise by 20% and car thefts to increase as offenders substituted these offenses for the more serious ones (Shepherd 2002). Similarly, a recent analysis of firearm sentencing enhancements – another popular “get tough” reform – found that gun robberies were indeed deterred by the extra sanction (Abrams 2006).

International scholars have also found that sanctions work to deter wrong-doing. In a German study, researchers found that households who had failed to pay their TV licensing fees were motivated to do so when the likelihood of detection by authorities was increased (Rincke and Traxler 2009). What is interesting about this study is that the authors found that deterrence was achieved when households who had been caught by field inspectors warned other households nearby. In other words, the fear of apprehension was unrelated to the actual presence of the field inspector; rather, it was generated by the perception that he would be arriving soon that prompted people to comply with the law. A study of German juvenile offenders also found that the “pain of imprisonment” serves as an important deterrent for adolescent men. Deprivation of autonomy and of contact with those on the outside lead to lower re-offending rates after release (Windzio 2006).

Although most researchers who study the relationship between imprisonment and deterrence examine changes in American law, a few recent studies involving changes in European policies also show a connection between imprisonment and deterrence. For example, a recent examination of French inmates found that when the government issued a collective pardon in honor of Bastille Day in June 1996, five-year recidivism rates for those inmates were directly correlated with the amount of sentence reduction that they received. Offenders who benefitted the most from the pardon were later found to have the highest rates of recidivism (Maurin and Ouss 2009). Similarly, a study of Italian offenders found that for each additional month of imprisonment imposed by the government, the likelihood to reoffend was reduced by 1.24% (Drago, Galbiati, and Vertova 2007). However, they did find that this deterrence effect disappeared with very long sentences.

If deterrence fails to curb crime, then incapacitation through imprisonment remains an option for the worst of offenders. The challenge that faces most lawmakers is ensuring that incapacitation is reserved for those offenders who present ongoing threats to public safety. In the past 15 years, California’s Three Strikes laws has been criticized for being too broad, and media reports of individuals sentenced to life in prison for minor offenses have been circulated widely. Despite these criticisms, however, government records show that the California Three Strikes law appears to be incapacitating the right type of offender. According to state Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation, only 5% of the entire inmate population was serving a 25-year-to-life sentence. In addition to their two previous serious or violent offenses, state records also show that nearly half had been sentenced for a third strike after conviction of a serious felony offense, and two-thirds of those serving a 25 year-to-life sentence had been sentenced for either a violent crime, burglary, or illegal possession of a weapon (see California State Department of Corrections, Data Analysis Unit).

Moreover, California statistics reveal that the combined effects of deterrence and incapacitation have worked to keep the growth of the prison population low. When the law was initially enacted, academic experts at the RAND Corporation predicted that the prison population would double in size between 1994 and 1998, from 125,000 to 250,000, and would likely reach 350,000 by 2004 (Greenwood 1994). However, these predictions have proven to be quite wrong. Between 1994 and 2004, the state prison population grew by only 35,000 inmates, and third-strikers accounted for less than one-fourth of that growth. Instead, experts believe that increased population for the state as a whole – California grew by 6 million people between 1994 and 2004 – is likely the cause of any expansion in the prison population.

Economic studies also show that the costs of incarceration are easily off-set by the cost savings generated by lower crime rates. In 1996, the Department of Justice issued a comprehensive report that warned against simply calculating the cost of crime as the actual losses incurred by the victim (Miller, Cohen, and Wiersema 1996). Intangible losses, such as pain and suffering, lost income, poor mental health, and diminished quality of life, all represented costs that the victim, society, and sometimes the government, would likely incur. For example, the authors calculated that the direct costs imposed upon a rape victim might only be $7,600 (adjusted for inflation), which usually represents the physical and mental health costs directly associated with the crime. Yet, if intangible costs, such as loss of quality of life, are quantified, the crime of rape is likely to cost the victim and society nearly $130,000. Although the cost of incarcerating offenders in prison costs between $22,000 $ 30,000 per offender per year, the savings produced by incapacitating high-rate offenders (who often commit between 10 – 20 offenses per year), is considered by many to be well worth the cost.

Impact on Minority Communities

Since enacting “get tough” reforms, policymakers have expressed concerns that minority populations may be disproportionately disadvantaged because minority offenders are already overrepresented in our nation’s criminal justice system. While the problem of overrepresentation is a perennial concern, research has found that the sentencing reforms enacted in the 1990s have not exacerbated the problem of overrepresentation as initially expected. Government statistics show that the number of minority inmates in state prisons has held study since 2000 (Sabol and Couture 2007), and studies of Oregon’s Measure 11 mandatory sentencing law and California’s Three Strikes law revealed that minority offenders fared no worse under these tougher sentencing laws than they had under the old sentencing laws (Merritt, Fain, and Turner 2004; Brown and Jolivette 2005).

Instead, research has begun to show that minority communities have actually benefitted under the tougher new laws because fewer members are being victimized. According to federal statistics, between 1996 and 2006, the number of crimes committed against black men decreased 44%, and the number of crimes committed against black women decreased 32%. The decreases reported for robbery were particularly significant. As Figure 3 reveals, prior to the “get tough” reforms, black men were victims of robbery nearly three times as often as white men; black women were robbed two and half times as often as white women. By 2006, the number of robbery victims reported in the victimization survey for all crimes and all races had dropped significantly, and the robbery rates for white men and black men were nearly equal. There were also fewer sexual assaults committed against women in general in 2006, but black women appeared to benefit the most; sexual assaults decreased 22% for white women, but declined by 36% for women of color (http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs).

Figure 3: Trend in Robbery Victimizations for Persons Age 12 and Over: 1996-2006
(Number per 1,000 Population)

Source: Bureau of Justice Statistics, Data Online: http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs

In many cases, less victimization means that fewer lives are lost to crime. Just recently, medical researchers suggested that the steep decline in crime appears to be responsible for extending the life span of black men in the United States. In 1993, the life expectancy gap between white men and black men was about seven years. Ten years later, the gap had narrowed to 5.3 years, even though black men encountered more economic and social instability and higher rates of incarceration than did white men (Harper et al. 2007). The authors suggest that the decrease in violent crime, especially homicide, was responsible for the encouraging findings. Furthermore, a study of California’s Three Strikes law also found that predominantly African-American communities reported significantly fewer rapes, robberies, burglaries, larcenies, and car thefts when compared to all other communities. This finding is very important, given that African-American communities had been previously been among the most victimized. The findings did not hold true for predominantly Hispanic communities, however, which have been greatly affected by the influx of recent immigrants (Chen 2008). Although studies have not examined this directly, immigration patterns may be responsible for keeping crime comparatively elevated in these neighborhoods.

The overall improvement in public safety – including the benefits experienced by residents in minority communities – likely explains why recidivist sentencing laws remain popular with voters. In California, a 2004 state ballot initiative gave voters an opportunity to weaken the law by limiting “strike” offenses to violent crimes only. Supporters of the initiative argued that narrowing the strike zone would save the state money, but voters rejected the measure 52.7% to 47.3%. Although the election was close, statistics revealed counties with relatively high crime rates rejected the attempt to weaken Three Strikes by higher margins than counties with moderate or low crime rates. In addition, many of these high-crime counties were more ethnically diverse, which suggests that minority voters are similarly inclined to retain the more stringent law (see information from the California Secretary of State at http://www.ss.ca.gov).

Other Sentencing Trends

In the post-“get tough” era, lawmakers have begun exploring supplemental programs that can help reduce recidivism rates and increase public safety. Many of these programs address specific concerns that cannot be fixed by deterrence or incapacitation alone. For example, research has demonstrated that drug addicts are difficult to deter because the physical addiction is a more power influence on individual decisionmaking than fear of punishment. Consequently, the recidivism rates for drug offenders are among the highest of all crime. In fact, some statistics reveal that drug-addicted criminals commit, on average, more than 60 crimes per year (Gebelein 2000). As a result, New York recently shortened prison sentences for drug users, and other states, including California, have begun adjudicating non-violent, first-time drug users in special drug court programs. Early results appear to be promising; however, states that do not provide a negative incentive, such as jail time or re-animation of a suspended prison sentence, run the risk of incurring high-drop out rates and even higher recidivism rates.

Despite the adoption of prison-alternatives for drug offenders, imprisonment remains the preferred policy option for dangerous persistent criminals. Recently, Oklahoma passed a law requiring violent offenders to register with law enforcement authorities for up to 10 years after their release from prison. In addition, offenders’ address information, fingerprint files, and DNA profiles are kept in a state-operated database system that can be accessed by police and corrections officials. Once they are released from prison, certain types of sex offenders must also register with authorities in nearly every state, and in most states, the offenders’ address information is made readily available to the public.

As parents have expressed increasing concern over the danger posed to their children by unrepentant pedophiles, states have responded with even tougher sentencing and monitoring requirements. In 2004, Georgia restricted first-time sex offenders from receiving a mitigated sentence, while legislators in Maine and Washington created new enhancements for pedophiles (Lyons 2005). Still, “Jessica’s Law,” adopted first in Florida, and replicated in a handful of states, is among the toughest: it imposes a mandatory 25-year-to-life sentence on offenders convicted of sexually assaulting children under 12 years of age and requires sex offenders to be monitored for life using GPS tracking equipment (Vansickle 2005). California’s version, recently enacted in 2006, also permanently bars sex offenders from living within 2,000 feet of a school or park.

Although the nation’s confidence in deterrence has not changed, lawmakers are beginning to show their willingness to provide programming and resources for offenders who are newly paroled. Even advocates of tough sentencing policies have come to realize that most offenders will be released at some point in time, and helping them successfully transition back into the community is a reasonable way to help lower rates of recidivism. In April 2008, Congress passed, with bipartisan support, a grant program entitled The Second Chance Act, which allocated $300 million for adult and juvenile re-entry services. Specific items covered by the law include programs to combat substance abuse, programs for vocational training, grants for housing for offenders newly returned to the community, and money for mental health services for adult and juvenile offenders. Although evaluations of this policy are still underway, preliminary evidence suggests that services like these can help to reduce the incidence of reoffending. Lawmakers also express hope that by offering these services, they can augment the crime reduction efforts with community-oriented assistance.

Conclusion

As with any public policy measure, lawmakers are naturally interested in determining if their public policy solutions are working as they originally intended. Yet, crime is a complex phenomenon, so proving whether a law is working or not can be a difficult task. Nevertheless, the abundance of evidence that has been generated in the last few years leads to two basic conclusions. First, crime has gone down suddenly and steeply since the laws were implemented. Second, much of the crime reduction benefit is directly related to these criminal justice reforms. Repeat offender sentencing laws, truth-in-sentencing measures, parole restrictions, and stricter policing standards have all worked together to bring about the greatest reduction in crime in the United States’ history. As a result, people are victimized less, neighborhoods are safer, and the public no longer fears crime as it once did. Although these laws are not flawless, and they do require financial support to maintain, the economic and social benefits of having much less crime appears to many to be well worth the cost.

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Appendix 1

Description of Three Strikes Laws Enacted 1993 -1996

Jurisdiction	Strike Zone Defined	Strikes Needed	Required Sentence
US Govt	Murder; voluntary manslaughter; assault w/intent to commit murder or rape; robbery; aggravated sexual abuse; abusive sexual contact; kidnapping; aircraft piracy; carjacking; extortion; arson; firearms use; serious drug crimes	Three	Mandatory life in prison without parole.
Alaska	All strikes must be serious felonies	Three	40 – 99 years in prison
Arkansas	Murder; kidnapping; robbery; rape; terrorist act. First degree battery, firing a gun from a vehicle, use of prohibited weapon, conspiracy to commit murder; kidnapping; robbery; rape; first degree battery; first degree sexual abuse	Two Three	Minimum 40 yrs in prison; no parole. Range of no parole sentences, depending on offense.
California	Any serious crime if one prior conviction is for a qualifying serious or violent offense. Any serious crime if two prior convictions are for eligible serious or violent crimes.	Two . Three	Double the presumptive sentence Indeterminate life sentence, with no parole eligibility for 25 years.
Colorado	Any Class 1 or 2 offense, or any Class 3 offense that is violent	Three	Mandatory life in prison; parole eligibility after 40 yrs
Connecticut	Murder; attempted murder; assault with intent to kill; manslaughter; arson; kidnapping; aggravated sexual assault; robbery; first deg. assault	Three	Up to life in prison
Florida	Any forcible serious crime; aggravated stalking; aggravating child abuse; lewd or indecent conduct; escape	Three	Life if third strike is first degree crime; 30-40 yrs if second degree crime; 10-15 yrs if third degree crime.
Georgia	Murder; armed robbery; kidnapping; rape; aggravated child molesting; aggravated sodomy; aggravated sexual battery. Any serious crime	Two Four	Mandatory life without parole. Mandatory max. sentence.
Indiana	Murder; rape; sexual battery with a weapon; child molesting; arson; robbery; burglary with a weapon or resulting in serious injury; drug dealing.	Three	Mandatory life without the possibility of parole.
Louisiana	Murder; attempted murder; manslaughter; rape; armed robbery; kidnapping; serious drug offenses; serious felonies. Four eligible convictions with at least one from above list.	Three Four	Mandatory life in prison without possibility of parole. Mandatory life in prison w/o parole
Maryland	Murder; rape; robbery; first or second degree sexual offense; arson; burglary; kidnapping; car jacking; manslaughter; use of firearm in serious crime; assault with intent to murder, rape, rob, or commit sexual offense. Separate prison terms required for each offense.	Four	Mandatory life in prison without parole.
Montana	Deliberate homicide; aggravated kidnapping; sexual intercourse without consent; ritual abuse of a minor. Mitigated deliberate homicide; aggravated assault; kidnapping; robbery	Two Three	Mandatory life in prison without parole. Mandatory life in prison without parole.
Nevada	Murder; robbery; kidnapping; battery; abuse of children; arson; home invasion.	Three	Life, with parole possible after 10 yrs or 25 years with parole after 10 yrs.
New Jersey	Murder; robbery; carjacking	Three	Mandatory life in prison without parole.
New Mexico	Murder; shooting at or from vehicle and causing harm kidnapping; criminal sexual penetration; armed robbery resulting in harm.	Three	Mandatory life in prison with parole eligibility in 30 years.
North Carolina	Qualifying violent crimes; separate indictment and finding that offender is “violent habitual offender”	Three	Mandatory life in prison without parole.
North Dakota	Any Class A, B, or C serious crime offense.	Two	If second strike is Class A crime, court may sentence to life; if Class B crime, up to 20 years; if Class C crime, up to 10 years.
Pennsylvania	Murder; voluntary manslaughter; rape; involuntary deviate sexual intercourse; arson; kidnapping; robbery; aggr. assault. Same offenses.	Two Three	Enhanced sentence of up to 10 years. Sentence of up to 25 years.
South Carolina	Murder; voluntary manslaughter; homicide by child abuse; rape; kidnapping; armed robbery; drug trafficking, embezzlement; bribery; certain accessory and attempt offenses.	Two	Mandatory life in prison without parole.
Tennessee	Murder; aggravated kidnapping, robbery, arson, or rape; rape of a child. Prior prison term required. Same as above, plus rape; aggravated sexual battery. Separate prison terms required.	Two Three	Mandatory life in prison without parole. Mandatory life in prison without parole.
Utah	Any first-or second-degree serious offense	Three	Three years to life without parole; judge has discretion.
Vermont	Murder; manslaughter; arson causing death; assault and robbery with weapon causing injury; aggravated assault, sexual assault, and domestic assault; kidnapping; maiming; lewd conduct with a child.	Three	Court may sentence up to life in prison.
Virginia	Murder; kidnapping; robbery; carjacking; sexual assault; conspiracy with above crimes	Three	Mandatory life in prison without parole.
Washington	Murder; manslaughter; rape; child molestation; robbery; aggravated assault; explosion with threat to humans; extortion; kidnapping; vehicular assault; arson; attempted arson; burglary; any crime with deadly weapon; treason; promoting prostitution; leading organized crime.	Three	Mandatory life in prison without parole.
Wisconsin	Murder; manslaughter; vehicular homicide; aggravated battery; abuse of children; robbery; sexual assault; taking hostages; kidnapping; arson; burglary.	Three	Mandatory life in prison without parole.

Sources: (Austin et al. 1999; Dickey 1998; Schiraldi, Colburn, and Lotke 2004).(Austin et al. 1999)